Blame Game
By Jay Bushinsky Posted Thu, Oct 19 2006
Journalists walk in the Beirut`s mainly Shiite southern suburbs that were targeted and demolished by Israeli air strikes in the Hizbollah stronghold of southern Beirut, Friday 21 July 2006. EPA/MOHAMED MESSARA
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Few Israelis believe their side won the latest war in Lebanon, and many attribute Hezbollah's tactical successes in part to irresponsible and unprofessional coverage by the local news media, especially TV broadcast coverage.
“Why did they insist on revealing where the incoming Katyusha rockets fell?” says a veteran author and journalist who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Was it their professional obligation to improve the enemy's aim?”
Considering that the Soviet-designed projectiles were not capable of precision bombardment, Israel's long-anachronistic military press censorship tried in vain to bar these disclosures. But the TV footage that showed the casualties and damage not only revealed the sites of impact to the Israeli public but also to the Hezbollah launch crews. The tell-all attitude of Israel's electronic reporters and cameramen was symptomatic of the spirit with which their government reacted to the abduction of two of its soldiers from Israeli territory on July 12. This sudden burst of open disclosure may have stemmed from over-confidence about the Israeli forces' performance and under-estimation of Hezbollah's combat capabilities.
It took a relatively long time, at least midway through the conflict, for the local media and many of their foreign counterparts to realize that Israel's armed forces were not what they had been cracked up to be. Their logistical backup was faulty, their intelligence infrastructure outdated and their strategical concepts unrealistic.
“The American generals we saw commenting on Fox TV caught on fast,” says Yitzhak Noy, Israel Radio's media analyst whose early-morning reviews of the Israeli press and weekly summary of the international weeklies draw avid listenership.
Unlike Fox TV, Noy says, the Israeli news media expected favorable results in the first phase of the war “and expected them to occur instantly.” As soon as they saw that the emphasis on air strikes was not accomplishing the desired effect, the calls for a ground assault began to mount. “But for that you need a political backup and there was none,” he says.
Unlike other Israeli news organizations, Noy contended that Haaretz, a daily newspaper, was fixated on an immediate cease-fire, possibly because it was quick to realize that Hezbollah's ballistic capabilities were mind-boggling and the losses in lives and property were horrendous. He recalled that its editorial columns advocated this day after day as the war proceeded.
On the other hand, the two Hebrew tabloids that are the country's circulation leaders, Yediot Aharonot and Ma'ariv, gave unstinting support to the military onslaught. The former's senior commentator, Eitan Haber, formerly an adviser to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and its veteran military reporter, Alex Fishman, justified the war.
Wars usually generate outstanding combat coverage, but without access to military troops and operations, coverage of this war was destined to disappoint. The chief military spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Miri Regev, and her team of uniformed assistants, were unwilling or unable to attach any journalists to the ground forces inside Lebanon as long as the combat was restricted to the border zone. After the first two weeks, when the Israeli troops had partially advanced, limited access was given to the closed circle of accredited military correspondents. Their international colleagues were kept out.
“We had very little access,” says Glenys Sugarman, secretary of the Foreign Press Association who also broadcasts for South Africa's Radio Kosmos 94.1 and Jacaranda Radio. There were only a few TV crews that went in as poolers, two print pools and no radio correspondents or photographers. More facilities were available to the Hebrew speakers working for the local media, possibly because the military were nervous about journalists being in the line of fire without knowing the national language.
But the Israeli reporters produced few compelling reports, with the exception of TV Channel Two's Itai Engel, who moved with the troops. Few could compare to
Stephen Farrell of The Times of London who produced a dramatic and vivid account of reservists in action.
Blame for faulty coverage of the conflict cannot be completely placed on access, though. The Jerusalem Post's Sarah Honig, whose weekly political column often shakes up the political establishment, assailed the Israeli TV coverage of the war because of its
“chatterbox syndrome.” She says they recruited Monday morning quarterbacks from among the country's gallery of retired army officers who went on to exude omniscience about every aspect of the conflict.
The TV channels that used this expertise often blindly followed their leads, without investigating or double-checking, Honig says. At the same time, she criticized them for “neglecting the people sweltering in the makeshift shelters” and failing to comment about the government's disinterest in their plight. The Israeli journalists generally received much more background and inside information than did their foreign colleagues. Details about military activities in, over and off the coast of Lebanon were parceled out sparingly to the non-Israeli media and comparatively generously to the locals. The unique group of 'Arab affairs reporters' evidently benefited from special sources, such as the Mossad and Shin Bet, the Israeli version of the FBI.
News coverage failed further, as reporters were reluctant to criticize leaders. Noy accused the “media stars” of doggedly protecting their “chosen icon,” a euphemism for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, if only because he had promised a sequel to the newly controversial pullout from the Gaza Strip in a 'convergence' or 'realignment' withdrawal from the West Bank. In several instances, the reserve generals “told all,” she says, implying excessive disclosure of sensitive tactical data, but refrained from painting the true battle picture: “no ammunition, no protective gear, no food, no water.”
There are also several examples of total or partial news blackouts that affected all the personnel intent on covering the Israel-Hezbollah crisis. For example, July 14 reports from Beirut about an Israeli naval vessel going up in flames off shore after being hit by a Hezbollah projectile were shrugged off in Tel Aviv as if they were hallucinatory. Belatedly, the official Israeli sources said that a fire had broken out aboard a missile boat, was quickly extinguished by the crew and the vessel “continued on its mission.”
More than 12 hours after the state-of-the art missile boat, “Hanit” caught fire, the Israelis finally conceded that it had been targeted by the guerrillas. They admitted that four crewmen, including an officer, were killed and the ship was heading back to base on itsown power. At least two days later, it emerged that the “Hanit” was 15 miles off the Lebanese coast when a Chinese-developed and Iranian-made C802 ground-to-sea missile followed its own radar beam until it struck its prey. What the military spokespersons did not say was that the Hanit's “Barak” (lightning) seaborne air-to-air missile was not activated. It could have deflected the incoming C802 by means of its own radar system. Some local military reporters may have known that the vessel was equipped with this advanced, locally-designed and made projectiles, but they did not come out immediately with the non-usage issue. Nor was there simultaneous disclosure that Hezbollah's C802 also hit a freighter more than 40 miles off shore. This ship was detected by the IDF's maritime surveillance equipment, but there were contradictory and unconfirmed reports of its nationality, either Egyptian or Cambodian. It was not clear if it stayed afloat or sank. All that was known is that 12 Egyptian crewmen were killed.
There were several commando raids about which the news media were unable to elicit solid and confirmed information from military spokespeople and sources, hindering coverage of important military events. One was the amphibious landing by Israeli Navy commandos at Tyre on the Mediterranean Sea. The attacking unit's objective never was revealed and details about its operations on the ground never were made known. Rumors soared in Tel Aviv's security-minded circles that the mission was pointless and unnecessary and therefore the casualty toll was especially tragic. But none of these assertions could be confirmed.
The same problem repeated itself in the instance of a paratroop unit that landed at Baalbek, in eastern Lebanon. As usual, the first reports of fighting there came from Beirut, not Tel Aviv. Israel's military command refused to say a word about it. Ultimately, a communiqué was issued saying the elite unit involved had been brought to the area aboard helicopters and that its purpose was to block the influx of arms and ammunition from Iran, by way of Syria, to Hezbollah guerrillas.
There was no coherent explanation from the military command in Tel Aviv for the unit operating more than 15 miles west of the Lebanese-Syrian border, and at this distance it seemed impossible to intercept incoming trucks from Syria. But regardless how persistent the questions, the replies were consistently evasive. Rumors flew about a local Hezbollah official who was kidnapped, as well as an Israeli belief that Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, was in the area. Both were dismissed by officials, without comment, regardless of whether they came from local or foreign correspondents.
After a general reluctance by many Israeli news reporters to criticize Prime Minister Olmert during the crisis, the Israeli news media appears to be gearing up for a more critical response to a committee set up by the Prime Minister to investigate how the conflict was handled. The formation of the committee marked a turning point in Israel's post-conflict political climate. At the end of August, several commentators from Israeli newspapers, including Ha'aretz, the Jerusalem Post and Hatzotfeh, criticized the committee, whose members were appointed by the Prime Minister and his staff, for providing and easy way out for the Prime Minister. Israeli citizens have also become skeptical and protested the committee that they feel only gives the appearance of accountability. Although it is only one instance of a more critical media, it is a hopeful sign that the Israeli media will be taking a more active watchdog role in coverage of the crisis.